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In this case Baby Boy L. is only 5/16ths Kiowa Indian, has
never been removed from an Indian family and so long as
the mother is alive to object, would probably never become
a part of the Perciado or any other Indian family. While it is
true that [the Indian Child Welfare] Act could have been
more clearly and precisely drawn, we are of the opinion that
to apply the Act to a factual situation such as the one before
us would be to violate the policy and intent of Congress rather than uphold them.
....
We conclude the trial court was correct in its determination
that the ICWA, by its own terms, does not apply to these
1
proceedings . . . .
From this point in ICWA interpretation and the development of common law, we are persuaded that abandonment
of the existing Indian family doctrine is the wisest future
course. Although we do not lightly overrule precedent, neither are we inextricably bound by it. Baby Boy L. is ready to
1. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175–76 (Kan. 1982), overruled by
In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
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I.

INTRODUCTION
3

It is often said that “hard cases . . . make bad law.” Few cases are
harder than those in which a judge must decide whether to remove a
child from her family, or where to place a child who has been
removed from his family. Those cases become even harder when the
4
child is American Indian.
For years, courts in a number of states did their best to prove the
5
aphorism true. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was enacted to
protect the interests of Indian children, Indian parents, and Indian
6
tribes. However, some state courts, confronted with the types of hard
cases that are abound in family law, created, then expanded, their
own exception to the ICWA—an exception that ignored the ICWA’s
specific language and allowed courts to set aside the Act when dealing
with a child that was not part of an “existing Indian family.”
For some twenty-seven years, the “existing Indian family” doctrine
has been central to ICWA jurisprudence. In nearly half of the states,
either the courts have been forced to address whether the ICWA
applies to an “Indian child” —a term clearly defined in the Act—who
is not part of an “existing Indian family” —a term that did not exist
until the Kansas Supreme Court invented it four years after the
7
ICWA’s passage — or legislatures have taken the question away from
the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court’s only foray into ICWA jurispru8
dence, in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, did not
directly address the “existing Indian family” doctrine, but did provide
the ammunition courts would need to shoot down the doctrine.
After a decade-and-a-half in which states adopted and rejected
2. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 549 (Kan. 2009) (citation omitted).
3. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The quotation may have originated in United States v. Clark, in which Justice
John Marshall Harlan wrote, “it is the duty of all courts of justice to take care, for the
general good of the community, that hard cases do not make bad law.” 96 U.S. 37, 49
(1877) (quoting Lord Campbell in East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. C. 111 (1849)).
4. In this article, we generally use American Indian or Indian, rather than
Native American. This preference is based in part on the use of the word “Indian” for
legal purposes dating back to the Constitution itself, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3, and of the word in the Act that this article considers: the Indian Child Welfare Act,
25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006) et seq.
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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the doctrine in roughly equal proportion, the tide began to turn. By
2009, the twentieth anniversary of the Holyfield decision, the “existing
Indian family” doctrine had lost virtually all of its legitimacy after
9
being abandoned by the very court that invented it. Today, only six
10
states employ the doctrine, and two of those states have expressly
11
limited its scope by refusing to apply it under certain circumstances.
12
Meanwhile, nineteen states have rejected the doctrine. Four of
those states—Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington —
previously had adopted the “existing Indian family” doctrine, only to
13
14
reverse themselves either by statute or in court. In addition to
Oklahoma and Washington, legislatures in Iowa, Minnesota, and

9. See infra Part V.
10. These states include Alabama (S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189–90 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1990) (where the child “has never been a member of an Indian family, has
never lived in an Indian home, and has never experienced the Indian social and
cultural world[, t]o apply the ICWA to the facts of this case would be contrary to the
congressional intent”)), Indiana (In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind.
1988) (holding that the ICWA applies when Indian children are being removed from
an Indian environment, and that where an Indian mother voluntarily gave up her
child “the ICWA should not be applied to the present case in which the purpose and
intent of Congress cannot be achieved thereby”)), Missouri (C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837
S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986)), Kentucky (Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996)), Louisiana (Hampton v.
J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995)), and Tennessee (In re Morgan, No. 02A019608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997)).
11. These states include Alabama (Ex parte C.L.J., 946 So. 2d 880, 889 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2006) (stating, “we may not extend the ‘Existing Indian Family’ exception to
encompass situations in which the child’s mother is an Indian but the child is alleged
to have had little to no contact with an Indian tribe”); S.H. v. Calhoun County Dep’t
of Human Res., 798 So. 2d 684, 692 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (in refusing to grant an
exception to the ICWA, holding “that in child-custody proceedings involving an
‘Indian child,’ as that term is defined in the ICWA, a state court must strictly construe
and apply the provisions of the Act”)), and Indiana (D.S. v. County Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare of St. Joseph County (In re D.S.), 577 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. 1991) (holding
that “where the mother is a Native American Indian, the mother and child, at least
presumptively for purposes of initiating ICWA inquiries, constitute an ‘Indian
family’”)).
12. These states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
13. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 40.1, 40.3 (West 2009), upheld by Leatherman
v. Yancey (In re Baby Boy L.), 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004) (abrogating In re S.C., 833
P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992), and In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla.
1985)); see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.040(3) (West Supp. 2010) (abrogating
Crews v. Hope Servs. (In re Adoption of Crews), 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992)).
14. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 549 (Kan. 2009) (overruling In re Adoption of
Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982)); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485
(S.D. 1990).
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Wisconsin have barred state courts from adopting the doctrine. In
the remaining twelve states, the doctrine has been explicitly rejected
16
17
by state high courts or intermediate appellate courts. Moreover, no
18
new state has adopted the doctrine in more than a decade.
California remains a curious case, but also remains reflective of
the rest of the nation.
Among the states’ appellate districts, only the Second Appellate
District remains firmly committed to the “existing Indian family”
19
20
doctrine, albeit in a narrow set of circumstances, and for reasons
21
that have been roundly rejected by other courts.
22
Meanwhile, the doctrine has been explicitly rejected in the First,
23
24
25
Third, Fifth, and Sixth Appellate Districts.
15. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232B.5(2) (West 2006) (upheld by In re R.E.K.F., 698
N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 2005)); MINN. STAT. § 260.771(2) (2008); Act 94, WIS. STAT. §
938.028(3)(a).
16. See In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989); Indian Tribe v.
Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 849 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho 1993); In re Adoption of Riffle,
922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543
A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988); L.S.W. v. K.B. (In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625, 635–36 (N.D.
2003).
17. See Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 7 P.3d 960, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); In re
N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 21 (Colo. App. 2007); In re Adoption of S.S., 622 N.E.2d 832, 839
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) [hereinafter S.S. I], rev’d on other grounds, 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill.
1995) [hereinafter S.S. II]; Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Boyd (In re Elliott), 554 N.W.2d 32,
35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Jeffrey A. v. Tohono O’odham Nation (In re Baby Boy C.),
805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 322–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206, 209
(Or. Ct. App. 1993) [hereinafter Quinn I], rev’d on other grounds, 881 P.2d 795 (Or.
1994) [hereinafter Quinn II]; D.J.C. v. P.D.C. (State in Interest of D.A.C.), 933 P.2d 993,
999 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
18. The last state to adopt the “existing Indian family” doctrine was Tennessee;
see In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
19, 1997).
19. See L.A. County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Arturo G.. (In re Santos
Y.), 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 2001); James R. v. Cindy R. (In re Bridget R.), 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
20. See Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516 (limiting “existing Indian family”
doctrine to situations when neither the Indian child nor either parent has any
“significant social, cultural or political relationship with their tribe”).
21. See infra Part IV.C.
22. See, e.g., Dennis H. v. Michael S. (In re Adoption of Lindsay C.), 280 Cal. Rptr.
194, 201 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying the ICWA because the doctrine does not pertain
to the specific facts of the case).
23. See, e.g., S. v. S. (In re Adoption of Hannah S.), 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 610 (Ct.
App. 2006).
24. See, e.g., Kern County Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Mishiola S. (In re Alicia S.), 76
Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 129 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he existing Indian family doctrine
frustrates the policies underlying the ICWA. . . .”).
25. See, e.g., Santa Cruz Human Res. Agency v. Paz M. (In re Vincent M.), 59 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2007).
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The Fourth Appellate District appears to have its own split. The
26
Third Division has embraced the doctrine. However, the Second
Division subsequently questioned whether it is bound by the Third
27
Division’s holding, and more recently went so far as to say it might
28
reject the doctrine altogether.
Moreover, the California Legislature passed a law expressly repu29
diating the doctrine. The Second District renewed its stance that the
30
doctrine is necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the ICWA
31
while the Sixth District, which previously had adopted the doctrine,
held that the statute required application of the ICWA and rejection
32
of the doctrine.
33
The California Supreme Court has refused to review these cases,
despite a specific request by Judge Bamattre-Manoukian in her
34
concurrence in Vincent M. that they do so.
Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has refused on several occasions to review decisions
35
on both sides of the “existing Indian family” doctrine.
This Article will demonstrate how state court judges and state
legislatures have effectively neutered the “existing Indian family”
doctrine in most jurisdictions where it has been considered, relegat26. See In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 1996).
27. See Orange County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Renea Y. (In re Suzanna L.), 127 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 860, 868 (Ct. App. 2002) (“On the facts before us, however, we need not decide
whether to accept the existing Indian family doctrine—much less whether to accept it as a
matter of legislative intent or constitutional imperative.”) (emphasis added).
28. C.B. v. A.H., No. E036849, 2005 WL 2082854, *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 30,
2005) (“[I]f we were to examine the rationale for the doctrine closely enough, we
might conclude that we must reject it altogether.”).
29. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224(c) (West 2008), previously codified at CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 360.6(c).
30. L.A. County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Arturo G. (In re Santos Y.),
112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 2001).
31. Crystal R. v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 427
(Ct. App. 1997).
32. Santa Cruz Human Res. Agency v. Paz M. (In re Vincent M.), 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d
321, 334 (Ct. App. 2007) (“An unambiguous federal statute and an unambiguous
state statute require the application of the ICWA’s substantive provisions whenever
the proceedings involve an Indian child. The plain language of these statutes
precludes the existence of an exception where there is no existing Indian family.”).
33. See, e.g., Vincent M, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 334 (examining California cases after
the enactment of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 360.6 and the United States Supreme
Court’s and California Supreme Court’s failure to address the doctrine).
34. Id. at 339–40.
35. See, e.g., Hoots ex rel. A.B. v. K.B., 541 U.S. 972 (2004); Fort Peck Assiniboone
& Sioux Tribes v. Tubridy, 517 U.S. 1104 (1996). See also Leslie Scarlotte Tubridy v.
Betty Jo Iron Bear (In re Adoption of S.S.) (S.S. II), 657 N.E.2d 935, 944 (Ill. 1995)
(listing cases that have not been granted certiorari).
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ing it to little more than a troublesome footnote in a handful of states.
Part II will provide the historical background for this discussion,
including the passage of the ICWA, the early development of the
doctrine, and Holyfield, the only case to date in which the U.S.
36
Supreme Court has tackled the ICWA.
Part III will show how
Holyfield forced courts to reconsider the “existing Indian family”
jurisprudence, giving some states ammunition to reject the doctrine,
and prompting other states to seek new justifications for the doc37
trine. Part IV recaps the last dozen years or so, which have seen a
wholesale rejection of the “existing Indian family” doctrine in every
38
new jurisdiction to consider it. Part V analyzes In the Matter of A.J.S.,
in which the Kansas Supreme Court overturns In re Adoption of Baby
Boy L. and rejects the “existing Indian family” doctrine, striking it
39
down in the very state where it began.
Finally, in Part VI we
conclude that although the “existing Indian family” doctrine is not
completely dead, its rationale has been persuasively shown to be
40
contrary to both the plain language and the intent of the ICWA. We
suggest that A.J.S. provides new grounds to challenge the “existing
Indian family” doctrine even in the states where it still holds sway, and
we predict that the tide will continue to turn against the doctrine until
41
eventually it is completely rejected.
II. BACKGROUND: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, THE “EXISTING
INDIAN FAMILY” DOCTRINE, AND MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW
INDIANS V. HOLYFIELD
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act
Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 amid “rising concern in the
mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families,
and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the
separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families
and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non42
Indian homes.” In the years leading up to the ICWA’s enactment,
36. Infra Part II.
37. Infra Part III.
38. Infra Part IV.
39. Infra Part V.
40. Infra Part VI.
41. See infra Part V. Of course, absent some federal statutory or judicial
pronouncement that the “existing Indian family” doctrine violates the ICWA or is
otherwise unlawful, complete rejection will need to come state-by-state.
42. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
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roughly twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children were
separated from their families and placed with non-Indian adoptive
43
homes, foster homes, or institutions. Congress called the disparity
44
between Indian and non-Indian placement “shocking.” In some
states, for example, “the risk run by Indian children of being separated from their parents [was] nearly 1,600 percent greater than it
[was] for non-Indian children,” an “Indian child welfare crisis . . . of
45
massive proportions.” Several witnesses described the detrimental
effects on Indian children removed from their cultural environ46
ments.
Tribes also expressed concern that state agencies were
removing Indian children based on misunderstandings of tribal
47
culture and values. In passing the ICWA, Congress stated that “[t]he
wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps
the most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life
48
today.”
49
Many reasons likely contributed to this tragedy, but the result
was unmistakable: Tribal communities were being stripped of their
50
Further, the practice of
most vital resource —their children.
removing Indian children from their tribal communities was occur51
ring in most cases “without due process of law.” For these and other
reasons, including the “abuses of the rights of Indian tribes . . . in the
43. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 46
(1974) (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Minnesota).
47. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public
Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 191–92
(1978) [hereinafter 1978 ICWA Hearings] (statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of
the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, appearing on behalf of the National Tribal
Chairmen’s Association).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531,
1978 WL 8515.
49. One possible reason might have been a fundamental misunderstanding by
state officials of the importance of extended families in child-rearing within tribal
communities. Id. at 10. Another might have been the economic incentive for child
placement agencies to remove Indian children. Id. at 11–12. Still another might
have been basic racial discrimination, or unawareness at best, and the dominant
society’s unwillingness to recognize the value in direct “parent”-like relationships
between an Indian child and his or her extended family or larger tribal community.
In America’s non-Indian communities, the role of primary parent or guardian is
typically reserved to a child’s actual in-home parents or guardians.
50. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2006).
51. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11.
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52

process,” Congress enacted the ICWA for the dual purpose of
“protect[ing] the best interests of Indian children and [promoting]
53
the stability and security of Indian tribes.”
To remedy this situation, the ICWA created a statutory scheme
that imposed procedural and substantive protections for three parties:
54
the Indian child, the Indian parents, and the child’s tribe. For
example, in an involuntary child custody proceeding, a tribe is
entitled to formal notice of the action, and a court may not terminate
a parent’s rights without a determination that maintaining the status
quo is likely to result in the child’s serious emotional or physical
55
damage. Prior to any such termination, the state must make “active
efforts” to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
56
designed to prevent the breakup of the child’s family. Finally, in any
Indian child adoption proceeding, the court generally must recognize
a preference to placement with the child’s extended family, other
57
members of the child’s tribe, or with other Indian families. Further,
when an Indian child resides on or is domiciled within an Indian
reservation, the ICWA grants exclusive jurisdiction over custody
58
proceedings involving the child to that tribe.
Both when articulating the reasons for the ICWA, and in drafting
the Act’s protective measures, Congress placed what the Holyfield
59
Court called a “considerable emphasis” on the negative effects
60
suffered by tribes when children were removed. These concerns were
expressed in the findings included in the ICWA, specifically “that
there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
61
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” In order to protect
this tribal interest, Congress included in the ICWA provisions
52. Id. at 27.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006).
54. Id. §§ 1901–1963.
55. Id. §§ 1912(a), 1912(f).
56. Id. § 1912(d).
57. Id. § 1915(a).
58. Id. § 1911(a).
59. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989).
60. 1978 ICWA Hearings, supra note 47, at 193 (quoting Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians Chief Calvin Isaac: “Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are
significantly reduced if our children, the only real means for the transmission of the
tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways
of their People. Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes’ ability to
continue as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more important
that tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally
determinative as family relationships.”).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2006).
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governing when a tribe retains jurisdiction over a case and laying out
62
the necessary conditions for state jurisdiction. Tribes were afforded
63
the right to intervene in state court cases involving Indian children.
Finally, in what the Holyfield Court called one of the ICWA’s “most
64
important substantive requirement[s],” the ICWA required that
65
Indian children be placed according to preferences. This favored
placement first within the family, then within the tribe, and then
within another Indian family, before considering non-Indian
66
placement—unless a court found “good cause” to the contrary.
B. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L. and the Early Years of the “Existing
Indian Family” Doctrine
Adoption of Baby Boy L. is a classic example of a hard case. Baby
67
Boy L. was born on January 29, 1981, in Wichita, Kansas. He was
68
five-sixteenths Indian by blood, the child of a non-Indian mother
and a father who was five-eighths Indian by blood and was an enrolled
69
member of the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma. On the day Baby Boy L.
was born, his mother executed a consent to adoption that “specifically
70
directed and limited to the adoptive parents named in the consent.”
There is no mystery why neither Baby Boy L.’s mother, nor the
courts, wanted his father to have custody. On the day Baby Boy L. was
born, his father was incarcerated at the Kansas State PenitentiaryIndustrial Reformatory and had convictions for battery, battery of
71
police officers, inciting a riot and resisting arrests. In holding that
the father was unfit to be a parent, the trial court took judicial notice
of the father’s prior drug use and of the father’s admission to
“numerous crimes, including armed robbery, that [he] apparently has
72
never been charged with.” Furthermore, the Kansas Supreme Court
noted evidence that the father “was violent toward members of his
own family, that he beat and abused the child’s mother, before and
62. Id. §§ 1911(a)–1911(b).
63. Id. § 1911(c).
64. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36.
65. Id. at 36–37.
66. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
67. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 172 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In
re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
68. Id. at 173.
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 179.
72. Id. (citing the trial court; internal quotations omitted).
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during the time she was pregnant, and that he broke into her house
73
and stole personal property from her.” It was no wonder, then, that
the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the finding that Baby Boy L.’s
74
father was unfit.
That, however, placed the court in a dilemma: Baby Boy L.’s father was unfit, and his mother had consented to adoption only by a
particular non-Indian family:
The mother of Baby Boy L. gave a consent to the appellees
to adopt her child. The consent was limited to the two
named appellees and was for their benefit only. She has
made it clear that if this adoption was denied for any reason,
or if an attempt was made to place the child for adoption
under the terms of the [Indian Child Welfare] Act, she
would revoke her consent and again take custody of her
child, and never consent to his placement with his father or
with the father’s extended Indian family, the Kiowa Tribe,
75
the grandparents or anyone else.
While the mother rejected the application of the ICWA, the statute itself was clear. As the Kansas Supreme Court recognized, only
two conditions are required under the Act: a “child custody proceeding” regarding an “Indian child,” as those terms are defined in the
76
Act. The Act’s definition of “child custody proceeding” specifically
includes “‘adoptive placement’ which shall mean the permanent
placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action
77
resulting in a final decree of adoption.” The court concluded that Baby
78
Boy L., who met the Kiowa Tribe’s enrollment requirements, and
was enrolled by the tribe, over his mother’s objections, shortly after
79
his birth, “must be considered an ‘Indian child’ within the defini80
tions of the Act.” So if there are only two prerequisites for the ICWA
to apply, and those prerequisites are satisfied, how could the court
avoid the ICWA’s preferences for placement with Baby Boy L.’s
extended Indian family, other Kiowa Indians, or other Indian
families?
The court took two avenues of attack. First, by selectively citing

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv) (2006) (emphasis added).
Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 176.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 176.
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from the ICWA, the court asserted that “the overriding concern of
Congress and the proponents of the Act was . . . to set minimum
standards for the removal of Indian children from their existing
81
Indian environment.” The court cited numerous sections of the Act
to support its assertion that “the underlying thread that runs
throughout the entire Act . . . [is] that the Act is concerned with the
removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family unit and the
82
resultant breakup of the Indian family.” Those selected sections of
the ICWA led the court to conclude that, “to apply the Act to a factual
situation such as the one before us would be to violate the policy and
83
intent of Congress rather than uphold them.”
In its second, less-developed argument, the court simply concluded that trying to apply the ICWA to Baby Boy L.’s adoption would
84
be futile because his mother would somehow prevent it. The court
noted that the mother had consented to adoption only by the
appellees, and would never consent to the application of the ICWA’s
85
placement preferences.
Any attempt to effect the preferential placement contemplated by the Act would necessarily result in the removal of
the baby from the custody of appellees and thereupon there
being no consent by the mother to any such action, the
child would be returned to her. We do not believe that
Congress intended such ridiculous results nor do we believe
that the Kiowa Tribe could in good faith recommend such a
86
procedure.
The 1982 Baby Boy L. decision quickly had a dramatic impact on
the implementation of the ICWA in a number of states. Oklahoma
became the second state to adopt the “existing Indian family”
87
doctrine, in 1985. Although the Oklahoma court neither cited nor
made reference to the Kansas case, their rationales are virtually
88
identical. The next year, the Missouri Court of Appeals followed
81. Id. at 175.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 177.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985).
88. Compare id. at 1062–64 (concluding that Congress’s concern, that the ICWA
addresses, is the unwarranted breakup of Indian families by non-Indian actors, and is
therefore applicable where courts are presented with Indian children being removed
from an Indian environment), with Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 174–76
(holding that the Act is concerned with the removal of Indian children from Indian
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90

suit, quoting the Kansas case at length and ultimately “agree[ing]
91
with the rationale of Baby Boy L.” The South Dakota Supreme Court
92
adopted the “existing Indian family” doctrine in 1987, citing both
93
the Kansas and Missouri cases favorably. In 1988, the Supreme
94
Court of Indiana, in deciding In re Adoption of T.R.M., cited to the
95
Oklahoma court. The day after T.R.M., the Supreme Court of New
Jersey became the first court to reject the “existing Indian family”
96
doctrine.
By then, five states had adopted the Kansas court’s
rationale, with only one rejecting it.
Despite the Supreme Court of Kansas’s repeated citation to the
ICWA, the court’s invocation of “the policy behind the adoption of
97
98
the Act” and “careful study of the legislative history,” none of that
99
legislative history makes its way into the court’s analysis. The flaws in
the Kansas Supreme Court’s approach—its failure to consider the
interests of the tribe itself, and its willingness to allow a parent to
subvert the intent of the ICWA —would be made clear seven years
later, in the first and only ICWA case to reach the U.S. Supreme
100
Court.
C. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Purposes Behind the ICWA
Twins B.B. and G.B. were born December 29, 1985, in Gulfport,
101
Mississippi. Both of their parents were members of the Mississippi
families and is therefore applicable to those situations, not those in which a nonIndian mother has arranged for an adoption of her partly Indian child who has never
been in an Indian environment).
89. In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the
ICWA did not apply because S.A.M. was not a member of an existing Indian family).
90. Id. at 608–09.
91. Id. at 609.
92. Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 654 (S.D. 1987).
93. Id. at 653. In citing to In Interest of S.A.M., the South Dakota court mistakenly
cites to Miller v. Miller, which begins on the same page that S.A.M. concludes. See
Miller v. Miller, 703 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d
at 603.
94. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
95. Id. at 302–03.
96. See In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J.
1988).
97. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In
re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 171–76.
100. See discussion infra Part II.C.
101. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989).
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Band of Choctaw Indians, and both were domiciled on the Choctaw
102
Indian Reservation, some two hundred miles from Gulfport. The
103
twins were born out of wedlock, and a trial court later noted that
their mother “‘went to some efforts to see that they were born outside
104
the confines of the Choctaw Indian Reservation.’”
The twins’
mother and father signed forms consenting to their adoption on
105
January 10, 1986, and January 11, 1986, respectively. The Holyfields
filed their petition for adoption on January 16, and the final adoption
106
decree was issued on January 28. Two months later, the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians moved to vacate the adoption decree,
noting that the ICWA gave the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over
107
children domiciled on the Reservation. The trial court rejected that
argument, stating that the twins had never resided on the Reservation
and that their parents had gone to great lengths to make sure that
108
such was the case.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
affirmed, finding that the twins had never been domiciled on the
109
Reservation.
The U.S. Supreme Court was not faced in Holyfield with the “existing Indian family” doctrine, as it evolved from Baby Boy L. However,
the Holyfield court made several findings that are directly relevant to
“existing Indian family” jurisprudence.
First, the Court noted the direct and detrimental consequences
to Indian children of being raised in non-Indian environments: “[I]t
is clear that Congress’[s] concern over the placement of Indian
children in non-Indian homes was based in part on evidence of the
detrimental impact on the children themselves of such placements
110
outside their culture.” The Court noted extensive testimony from
mental health professionals about Indian children, raised in nonIndian environments, suffering identity crises upon learning of their
111
heritage. The Kansas court, in focusing only on whether an Indian

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 37–38, 38 n.8.
106. Id. at 38.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 39.
109. Id. (“‘At no point in time can it be said the twins resided on or were
domiciled within the territory set aside for the reservation.’”) (quoting Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (In re B.B.), 511 So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987)).
110. Id. at 49–50.
111. Id. at 33 n.1, 50 n.24.
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112

family was affected, and not on how the Indian child might suffer as a
result of placement in a non-Indian family, ignored at least one of the
central purposes of the ICWA.
Second, the Holyfield Court concluded that Indian tribes have
their own unique and compelling interest in the placement of Indian
children: “While much of the testimony again focused on the harm to
Indian parents and their children who were involuntarily separated by
decisions of local welfare authorities, there was also considerable emphasis
on the impact on the tribes themselves of the massive removal of their child113
ren.” The Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
had himself testified during hearings on the ICWA, stating that Indian
children raised in non-Indian homes were less likely to take up and
114
pass on the tribe’s culture and values.
Provisions in the ICWA
concerning notice to the tribe and preserving tribal jurisdiction over
some cases were express efforts to uphold that tribal interest: “The
ICWA thus, in the words of the House Report accompanying it, ‘seeks
to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of
115
the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.’”
116
The Kansas court’s focus exclusively on the “existing Indian family,”
to the exclusion of the Kiowa Tribe’s interests, ignored this vital
component of the ICWA.
Finally, the Court in Holyfield found that the parents’ efforts to
avoid ICWA jurisdiction by giving birth and consenting to adoption
far away from the Choctaw Indian Reservation could not be allowed to
117
subvert the Act.
Allowing a parent or parents to undermine the
118
ICWA would be “inconsistent with what Congress intended.”
“Permitting individual members of the tribe to avoid tribal exclusive
jurisdiction by the simple expedient of giving birth off the reservation
would, to a large extent, nullify the purpose the ICWA was intended
119
to accomplish.” If individual Indian parents could not subvert the
ICWA, it is hard to believe that individual non-Indian parents, such as
Baby Boy L.’s mother, would have any more authority to do so.

112. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re
A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
113. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 34–35.
115. Id. at 37 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
116. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 168.
117. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 52.
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III. RETHINKING THE ICWA AFTER HOLYFIELD: NEW REASONS TO
REJECT THE “EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY” DOCTRINE, AND NEW
REASONS TO EMBRACE IT
A. Holyfield, Legislative Intent, and Rejecting the “Existing Indian
Family” Doctrine
Although Holyfield did not directly address the “existing Indian
family” doctrine, the case’s effect was felt almost immediately in the
state jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine. Within the year,
Alaska’s Supreme Court became the second state high court to reject
120
the doctrine, citing Holyfield as persuasive on three accounts. First,
according to the T.N.F. court, Holyfield stood for the proposition that
the ICWA was enacted to protect not only the interest of Indian
121
families, but also that of Indian tribes and Indian children.
The
Alaska court stated that “[r]eliance on a requirement that the Indian
child be part of an Indian family for the Act to apply would undercut
the interests of Indian tribes and Indian children themselves that
Congress sought to protect through the notice, jurisdiction and other
122
procedural protections set out in [the] ICWA.”
Second, the T.N.F. court expressed reservations about “the crea123
tion of judicial exceptions to the plain language of [the] ICWA.”
The court was particularly critical of the Indiana Supreme Court’s
decision in In re Adoption of T.R.M., in which the Act was held not to
apply when an Indian mother who had voluntarily given up her child
for adoption to a non-Indian couple, circumventing the ICWA, sought
124
to get the child back. “It would seem that the adoption in T.R.M.
was exactly the type of scenario in which Congress sought to impose
federal procedural safeguards in order to protect the rights of the
125
Indian parents and their tribe,” the Alaska court wrote.
Finally, the T.N.F. court questioned the propriety of states interpreting exceptions into an Act that clearly was intended to limit states’
126
discretion — an intent the Alaska court had no problem finding
127
128
either in Holyfield or in the statute itself.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
1988).
125.
126.
127.

See In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 978 (Alaska 1989).
Id. at 977.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see J.Q. v. D.R.L. (In re Adoption of T.R.M.), 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind.
In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 977.
Id. at 977–78.
See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S 30, 45 (1989) (“More
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More dramatic was the reversal in South Dakota. Less than two
years before Holyfield, the South Dakota Supreme Court embraced the
129
“existing Indian family” doctrine in Claymore v. Serr. Like the cases
130
131
132
before it in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Missouri, Claymore involved
an attempt to terminate an Indian father’s parental rights to his
133
illegitimate child. The court recognized that the essential elements
of an ICWA case—”both an Indian child and a child custody proceed134
ing” —were present. However, noting that the trial court had relied
on the rationale put forth in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., the South
Dakota court said “the requirement of an existing Indian family . . . is
135
implied throughout the Act.” The court then went on to state that
Claymore had never married the child’s mother, that the child had
never lived with Claymore or his family, and that Claymore had never
supported the child —therefore, there was no “existing Indian
136
family.” Having already concluded that “the purpose of [the] Act
suggests that such a finding is a necessary condition for application of
137
the Act,” the South Dakota court held that the ICWA did not apply.
Holyfield quickly upended that conclusion. A scant year after the
Holyfield decision was announced, the South Dakota Supreme Court
again faced the “existing Indian family” doctrine in In re Adoption of
138
Baade. The adoptive parents, citing Claymore, argued that the ICWA
was inapplicable because the Indian child had never been part of an
139
Indian family. The court, though, citing Holyfield, said Claymore no
specifically, its purpose was, in part, to make clear that in certain situations the state
courts did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Indeed, the
congressional findings that are a part of the statute demonstrate that Congress
perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended
to correct.”).
128. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 978 n.10 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)
(“Congress finds the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”) (emphasis added)).
129. 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987).
130. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re
A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
131. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
132. In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
133. Claymore, 405 N.W.2d at 652.
134. Id. at 653.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 654.
137. Id.
138. 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990).
139. Id. at 489.
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longer applied:
In Holyfield, the Supreme Court explained the broad scope
of [the] ICWA: “The numerous prerogatives accorded the
tribe through the ICWA’s substantive provision . . . must,
accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the
interests of individual Indian children and families, but also
of the tribes themselves.” Consequently, it is incorrect, when
assessing [the] ICWA’s applicability to a particular case, to
focus only upon the interests of an existing family. Such a
practice fails to recognize the legitimate concerns of the
tribe that are protected under the Act. ICWA’s application
to a case is contingent only upon whether an “Indian child”
is the subject of a “child custody proceeding” as those terms
140
are defined by the Act.
The rout was on. In 1990, California’s Third Appellate District
141
cited Holyfield in In re Crystal K. for the proposition that it is in an
Indian child’s best interest that the relationship between child and
142
tribe be protected, becoming the first California court to directly
143
address the “existing Indian family” doctrine. The following year,
Indiana’s high court began to retreat from its embrace of the
144
doctrine, and California’s First Appellate District, rejecting the
145
doctrine in Dennis H. v. Michael S. (Adoption of Lindsay C.), cited
Holyfield extensively for the ideas that states were part of the problem
146
the ICWA was intended to fix, that the act also protects not only the
147
rights of families but also the rights of tribes and Indian children,
and that state law cannot be allowed to frustrate federal policy toward
140. Id. at 489–90 (citations omitted) (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S 30, 49 (1989)).
141. 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1990).
142. Id. at 665–66.
143. Two other California courts discussed the doctrine earlier, but ruled instead
on other grounds. In In re Junious M., the First Appellate District was critical of
Kansas’s Adoption of Baby Boy L. decision and said that a requirement that a child
identify as Indian in order to be covered by the ICWA would undermine the purposes
of the Act. See Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City & County of San Francisco v. Diana L. (In re
Junious M.), 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Ct. App. 1983). On the other hand, the Second
Appellate District cited both In re Adoption of Baby Boy L. and Claymore positively before
holding that the ICWA did not apply because the child was a Canadian Indian and
not a member of a federally-recognized tribe. L.A. County Dep’t of Children’s Servs.
v. Mary P. (In re Wanomi P.), 264 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630–31 (Ct. App. 1989).
144. See D.S. v. County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of St. Joseph County (In re D.S.), 577
N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991) (limiting application of the doctrine).
145. 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991).
146. Id. at 198.
147. Id. at 199.
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148

Indians.
Holyfield has raised new questions regarding the continuing
viability of Baby Boy L. and its progeny. As stated by one legal scholar, “After the decision in Holyfield, it appears that
the Kansas court in Baby Boy L. may have given inappropriate weight to the wishes of the family. The United States
Supreme Court seems unlikely to protect the implied right of
the non-Indian mother to entirely exclude the applicability
of the Act which explicitly protects the right of a tribe to intervene in any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
149
child.”
As Indian Country would soon see, the First Appellate District’s
faith that Holyfield could slay the “existing Indian family” doctrine
single-handed was misplaced. Just as Holyfield threw up obstacles, state
courts would find new ways to circumvent the ICWA.
B. State Court Resistance: Justifying the “Existing Indian Family”
Doctrine in a Post-Holyfield World
1. Limitation, Distinction and Cooption: Ignoring and Selectively
Quoting Holyfield to Uphold the Doctrine
Where courts wanted to adopt the “existing Indian family” doctrine, their first strategy often was, either implicitly or explicitly, to
limit Holyfield to the issue of domicile. In November 1990, Alabama
became the first new jurisdiction to adopt the “existing Indian family”
post-Holyfield, when the state Court of Civil Appeals decided S.A. v.
150
E.J.P.
The Alabama court made only a passing reference to
Holyfield, citing it for the proposition that the ICWA was passed
because of “concern in the 1970’s over the consequences of the
removal of Indian children from their Indian families and Indian
151
tribes by abusive child welfare practices.” By focusing exclusively on
the removal of Indian children from their families and tribes, the
Alabama court conveniently ignored Holyfield’s— and the ICWA’s—
language regarding voluntary termination of parental rights, the
152
rights of tribes and the rights of Indian children.
Other courts took pains to distinguish Holyfield. The Louisiana
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978: A Practical Guide with [Limited] Commentary, 34 S.D. L. REV. 660, 671 (1989)).
150. 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
151. Id. at 1188 (citation omitted).
152. See id. at 1189.
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Court of Appeal, in adopting the “existing Indian family” doctrine,
wrote that “Holyfield dealt with only the issue of jurisdiction under the
153
ICWA and therefore may be construed narrowly.” Similarly, when
California’s Sixth Appellate District initially adopted the “existing
154
Indian family” doctrine, it explained that:
[w]e do not believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Holyfield abrogates the existing Indian family [doctrine]. Holyfield was concerned with the interpretation of the
jurisdictional provisions of section 1911(a), and specifically
with the term “domicile” as used in the Act. The court did
not mention the existing Indian family doctrine and did not
address the [question of] whether the Act should apply in
the absence of such a family because both parents in Holyfield resided on the reservation and clearly had significant
155
ties to tribal culture.
Not content simply to say that Holyfield did not directly address
the “existing Indian family” doctrine or to quote selectively from
Holyfield’s passages interpreting the ICWA, some courts have gone
much further. Adoption of Crews involved a Choctaw woman’s decision
first to put her child up for adoption, and then to revoke her consent
156
to the adoption. The court held that neither Crews nor her family
had ever constituted an Indian family, that there was no evidence that
allowing Crews to revoke her consent would result in her child being
placed in an Indian environment, and that applying the ICWA under
157
such circumstances would run counter to the Act’s purposes. Then,
turning to the Holyfield Court’s conclusion that the parents could not
158
act to undermine the ICWA, the Washington court wrote:
In so holding, however, the [C]ourt made clear that the
153. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995). The court also
sought to distinguish Holyfield by arguing that in Holyfield the parents had been trying
to circumvent the ICWA, while the mother in Hampton was simply seeking to employ
the Act as a means of withdrawing her consent to the adoption of her child and the
termination of her parental rights. Id. This argument brought a sharp rejoinder
from Judge Stewart, who wrote that “J.L.’s not seeking to circumvent the ICWA or
undermine the tribe’s interest should be viewed as points in her favor rather than
reasons to exclude her from the Act’s coverage.” Id. at 340 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
154. See Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (Ct. App. 1997).
155. Id. at 426.
156. See Crews v. Hope Servs (In re Adoption of Crews), 825 P.2d 305, 306–07
(Wash. 1992) (en banc).
157. See id. at 310.
158. Id. at 310; see generally Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 51–53 (1989) (holding that a rule of domicile allowing Indian parents to defeat
the ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme is not consistent with Congress’ intentions).
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purpose of the ICWA was to avoid the “[r]emoval of Indian
children from their cultural setting [because such removal]
seriously impacts a long-term tribal survival and has damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian children.” Thus, Holyfield supports our conviction that
[the] ICWA is not applicable when an Indian child is not
being removed from an Indian cultural setting, the natural
parents have no substantive ties to a specific tribe, and neither the parents nor their families have resided or plan to
reside within a tribal reservation. In such a situation,
whether or when a child meets the definition of “Indian
159
child” under [the] ICWA is not controlling.
Thus, by essentializing the ICWA as a measure aimed solely at the
160
“removal of Indian children from their cultural setting,” and by
161
citing a passage from Holyfield that appears to lend support, the
Crews court asserted the U.S. Supreme Court’s endorsement of the
“existing Indian family” doctrine. It was a popular assertion, repeated
162
by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, and the dissent
163
in Quinn I. But it was not as influential in future cases as the new
164
argument, first presented in In re S.C., that Congress had tacitly
approved of the “existing Indian family” doctrine in the years since
165
the passage of the ICWA.
2. Legislative Intent and Whole Cloth: Whether Congress Embraced
the Doctrine by Failing to Eliminate It
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s post-Holyfield affirmation of
166
the “existing Indian family” doctrine came in 1992 in In re S.C. The
Oklahoma court cited the decade-old Kansas case, Adoption of Baby Boy
L., for the proposition that preserving Indian families is the “underly167
ing thread” of the ICWA.
Then the court added a persuasive

159. Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 310–11 (quoting Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50).
160. Id. at 310.
161. See id.
162. See C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
163. Quinn v. Walters (Quinn I), 845 P.2d 206, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)
(Edmonds, J., dissenting), rev’d, 881 P.2d 795 (Or. 1994).
164. In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992), overruled by Leatherman v. Yancey (In
re Baby Boy L.), 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004), and superseded by statute, OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 40.1 (2009).
165. See id. at 1255.
166. See id. at 1254–55.
167. Id. at 1255 (citing In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan.
1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009)).
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postscript:
Our interpretation is supported by recent events in the
Congress. In 1987 amendments were presented by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. These proposed
amendments were occasioned by the courts’ refusing to apply the ICWA to situations like this one. The amendments,
if enacted, would have made application of the ICWA mandatory regardless of whether the child had “previously lived
in Indian country, in an Indian cultural environment or with
an Indian parent.” However, the amendments never came
out of the Senate Committee, and at the time of this writing,
have not been presented again. Congress, being aware of
the [sic] this Court’s decision in In re D.M.J., as well as decisions from other states using similar reasoning, has refused
to change the statutory language to do away with this inter168
pretation.
Perhaps no single paragraph in “existing Indian family” jurisprudence, save the Kansas court’s initial declaration in In re Adoption of
169
Baby Boy L., has been so immediately influential. Over the next five
years, the failure of those amendments to reach the floor was cited by
170
171
172
173
majorities in Hampton, In re Bridget R., Rye, and In re Morgan;
174
175
the concurring opinion in S.S. II; and dissents in In re Baby Boy Doe
168. Id. (citation omitted).
169. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (“A careful study of the
legislative history behind the Act and the Act itself discloses that the overriding
concern of Congress and the proponents of the Act was the maintenance of the
family and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes and to set minimum
standards for the removal of Indian children from their existing Indian environment.
It was not to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an
Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should be removed from its
primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment over the express
objections of its non-Indian mother. Section 1902 of the Act makes it clear that it is
the declared policy of Congress that the act is to adopt minimum federal standards
‘for the removal of Indian children from their [Indian] families.’ Numerous
provisions of the Act support our conclusion that it was never the intent of Congress
that the Act would apply to a factual situation such as is before the court.”) (alteration
in original).
170. See Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
171. See James R. v. Cindy R. (In re Bridget R.), 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 522 n.11 (Ct.
App. 1996).
172. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996) (citing In re S.C., 833 P.2d
1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992)).
173. See In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880, at *14 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997).
174. See Leslie Scarlotte Tubridy et al. v. Betty Jo Iron Bear et al. (In re Adoption of
S.S.) (S.S. II), 657 N.E.2d 935, 945 (Ill. 1995) (Heiple, J., concurring).
175. See Indian Tribe v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 849 P.2d 925, 934 (Idaho 1993)
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176

and S.S. I.
Although Judge Stewart, in his dissent to Hampton,
excoriated the logic of using a failed amendment to demonstrate
177
intent, most opinions rejecting the “existing Indian family” doctrine
simply ignored the failed amendments.
3. In re S.C.: Making the Case for the “Existing Indian Family”
Doctrine after Holyfield
For backers of the “existing Indian family” doctrine, the beauty of
In re S.C. went far beyond the court’s excavation of a failed Senate
178
amendment. The case encapsulated everything a court needed to
179
say to defend the doctrine in a post-Holyfield environment.
First, the S.C. court framed Holyfield narrowly. By citing Justice
Brennan’s declaration that “[t]he sole issue in this case is, as the
Supreme Court of Mississippi recognized, whether the twins were
180
‘domiciled’ on the reservation,” the Oklahoma court conveniently
puts aside both the six pages of Holyfield, in which Justice Brennan
181
discusses the expansive rights afforded tribes under the ICWA, and
the ensuing five pages, in which Justice Brennan explains why
allowing Mississippi’s definition of “domicile” would undermine the
182
ICWA. The Oklahoma court returned to this argument to rebut the
(Bakes, J., dissenting).
176. See Leslie Scarlotte Tubridy et al. v. Betty Jo Ironbear (In re Adoption of S.S.)
(S.S. I), 622 N.E.2d 832, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (Colwell, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom.
Leslie Scarlotte Tubridy et al. v. Betty Jo Iron Bear et al. (In re Adoption of S.S.) (S.S.
II), 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995).
177. See Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 340–41 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
178. See In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992), overruled by Leatherman v.
Yancey (In re Baby Boy L.), 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004), superseded by statute, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 40.1 (2009).
179. That should come as no surprise, as the Oklahoma court took the case
specifically “to address the question” of whether the doctrine “is inconsistent with the
recent Supreme Court [ruling] of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.” In re
S.C., 833 P.2d at 1252.
180. Id. at 1253 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42
(1989)).
181. Referring to Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32–37.
182. Referring to Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43–47. In Holyfield, the Court stated that:
We start . . . with the general assumption that “in the absence of a plain
indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.” One reason
for this rule of construction is that federal statutes are generally intended to
have uniform nationwide application.
Id. at 43 (citations omitted). The Court went on:
[T]he purpose of the ICWA gives no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for the definition of a critical term; quite the
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conventional wisdom that, by emphasizing the rights of tribes,
Holyfield undercuts a theory based entirely on the Indian children and
183
Indian families.
The Oklahoma court then emphatically defended the “existing
Indian family” doctrine from the charge that it was “judicially
created.” Without citing the ICWA, the court asserted that “the
preservation of the existing Indian family was an integral purpose of
184
the ICWA from its inception.” The court then cited Crews for the
proposition that Holyfield supports the “existing Indian family”
185
doctrine.
Finally, the court distinguished the “existing Indian family” doctrine from its holding, just a year earlier, that the two “[e]xpress
exceptions in [the ICWA] exclude all other exceptions. Recognition
of a third exception —that the act will not apply to intra-family
custody disputes—would require judicial legislation rather than
186
statutory interpretation.” With a circularity that would make even a
rhythmic gymnast’s head spin, the court asserted that “[t]he rule
restricting application of the ICWA to an existing Indian family is not
[a] purely judicial creation” because “it is supported amply by the
language of the Act itself, and shored up by Congress’ refusal to
187
amend the Act.”
The final reason that In re S.C. was so influential in those jurisdictions that adopted the conventional rationale for the “existing Indian
family” doctrine was, simply, that it came from Oklahoma, “which
contains a large Indian population and consequently [is] one of the
states most often presented with this vexing problem, [and] has been
188
one of the leading states in developing this doctrine.” In light of
189
the Oklahoma Legislature’s response though, the court may have
contrary. . . . Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part of the statute
demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly
responsible for the problem it intended to correct.
Id. at 44–45. Finally, the Court stated that “[u]nder these circumstances it is most
improbable that Congress would have intended to leave the scope of the statute’s key
jurisdictional provision subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law.”
Id. at 45.
183. See In re S.C., 833 P.2d at 1254.
184. Id. at 1255.
185. See id. (citing Crews v. Hope Servs. (In re Adoption of Crews), 825 P.2d 305,
310 (Wash. 1992)).
186. Id. at 1256 (citing In re Guardianship of Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla.
1991)).
187. Id. at 1256.
188. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Ky. 1996).
189. See infra Part IV.A.
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been too clever by half.
4. A Judicially-Created Savings Clause: In re Bridget R. and the
Constitutional Argument for the Doctrine
For almost fifteen years after the Kansas court in In re Adoption of
190
Baby Boy L. first articulated the “existing Indian family” doctrine,
judges embracing the idea employed the same rationale —that
Congress had only meant for the ICWA to cover Indians who were
living in an “Indian environment,” and that the doctrine, although
not explicitly spelled out in the Act, was necessary for courts to
191
properly apply the ICWA.
Then the “existing Indian family”
doctrine arrived in California, and it took on a new identity: savings
clause.
192
In In re Bridget R., a Pomo Indian father and non-Indian mother
voluntarily relinquished their twin girls to a non-Indian couple less
than a month after the girls’ births, then later sought to withdraw
193
their consent to the adoption.
The trial court held that the
relinquishments failed to meet the requirements of the ICWA and,
194
On appeal, the adoptive parents argued
therefore, were invalid.
that the trial court erred by refusing to apply the “existing Indian
195
family” doctrine. But the court rejected the doctrine’s traditional
formulation, holding that Holyfield implicitly rejected an exception
premised on whether the child had ever been part of an Indian
196
environment. “However, it does not follow from Holyfield that [the]
ICWA should apply when neither the child nor either natural parent has
ever resided or been domiciled on a reservation or maintained any
significant social, cultural or political relationship with an Indian
197
tribe.”
Thus, the court accepted the adoptive family’s second argument:
that an ICWA without an “existing Indian family” limitation would
unconstitutionally violate the due process and equal protection rights
of the twin girls and the Tenth Amendment reservation of powers by
190. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 176 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In
re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
191. See, e.g., In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(adopting the rationale of In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.).
192. James R. v. Cindy R. (In re Bridget R.), 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
193. Id. at 515–18.
194. Id. at 516.
195. Id. at 519.
196. Id. at 522.
197. Id.
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198

the State of California.
As we explain, recognition of the existing Indian family doctrine is necessary in a case such as this in order to preserve
the ICWA’s constitutionality. We hold that under the Fifth,
Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate
a voluntary termination of parental rights respecting an Indian child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the
child’s biological parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian descent, but also maintain a significant social,
199
cultural or political relationship with their tribe.
The court first argued that, absent such “social, cultural or political” ties, subjecting the girls to the procedural requirements of the
200
ICWA would violate their due process rights. Quoting the Califor201
nia Supreme Court in In re Jasmon O., the Second District held that
“[c]hildren . . . have fundamental rights—including the fundamental
right to be protected from neglect and to ‘have a placement that is
202
stable [and] permanent.’” Furthermore, the child’s right to such
stable environment will outweigh the parent’s interests “where a
child’s biological parents knowingly and intelligently relinquish the
child to others for the express purpose of giving the child a loving and
203
stable home.”
Finally, because any tribe’s interest in a child is based in the
ICWA, while the child’s interest in a stable environment is a “constitutionally protected interest,” the child’s interest outweighs that of the
204
tribe.
Therefore, to the extent that the ICWA interferes with a
child’s right to a stable environment, the ICWA must survive strict
205
scrutiny. Although the court conceded that “preserving American
Indian culture is a legitimate, even compelling, governmental
interest,” it held that that interest cannot be achieved—and strict
scrutiny cannot be met—if neither the child nor either parent has
206
ever had a social, cultural or political relationship with a tribe. As a
198. Id. at 518–19.
199. Id. at 516.
200. Id.
201. San Diego County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Gavin O. (In re Jasmon O.), 878 P.2d
1297 (Cal. 1994).
202. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524 (quoting In re Jasmon O., 878 P.2d at
1307.
203. Id. at 526.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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result, an ICWA without an “existing Indian family” doctrine unconsti207
tutionally violates the due process rights of Indian children.
The court made a similar argument regarding equal protection.
The court asserted, without support, that because of the procedural
requirements of the ICWA,
the number and variety of adoptive homes that are potentially available to an Indian child are more limited than
those available to non-Indian children, and an Indian child
who has been placed in an adoptive or potential adoptive
home has a greater risk than do non-Indian children of be208
ing taken from that home and placed with strangers.
Inserting its chosen language into the U.S. Supreme Court’s
209
holdings in United States v. Antelope, Moe v. Confederated Salish &
210
211
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, and Morton v. Mancari, the
court said such disparate treatment is acceptable if either the Indian
child or a parent has a significant “social, cultural or political
212
relationship[]” with the tribe. However, in the absence of such a
213
relationship, the disparate treatment can only be based on race and
214
must withstand strict scrutiny. Employing the same strict scrutiny
analysis that was used for the due process claim, and with the same
outcome, the court held that the ICWA, without an “existing Indian
family” limitation, unconstitutionally violates the equal protection
215
right of some children.
Finally, under the Tenth Amendment and the Indian Commerce
216
Clause, the court found that, because family law typically is left to
the states, a federal law can only supersede state law in this area if a
217
“clear and substantial federal interest[]” is at stake. In others words,
the “ICWA should apply rather than state laws respecting family
relations only where such application actually serves the specific
purposes for which ICWA was created,” and that cannot happen
successfully unless either the child or a parent has a “significant
207. Id. at 527.
208. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
209. 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
210. 425 U.S. 463, 480–81 (1976).
211. 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
212. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
213. Id. at 527–28.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 527–29.
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
217. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 528 (quoting Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619,
625 (1987)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 12
9. Lewerenz-McCoy.docx

2010]

1/18/2010 10:29 PM

“EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY” JURISPRUDENCE

711

relationship[] with an Indian tribe or community or with Indian
218
culture.”
The In re Bridget R. rationale subsequently was adopted by Cali219
fornia’s Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. Two decisions
out of the District’s Division Two raise some question as to what
220
extent the doctrine is in force within the Fourth District. However,
221
despite enactment of a state statute specifically intended to abrogate
222
the In re Bridget R. holding, the Second Appellate District has stood
by its ruling. In L.A. County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Arturo G.
223
(In re Santos Y.), the court held that the state legislature could not
224
save the Act from constitutional infirmities under due process or
225
The In re Santos Y. court even held that the
equal protection.
legislature could not save the Act’s Tenth Amendment problem
because, even though the State of California retains its right to
legislate in the area of family law, it ceded to the federal government
226
authority to legislate over tribes.
Combined, these new interpretive and constitutional arguments
developed by the states kept the “existing Indian family” doctrine
afloat for almost a decade after Holyfield. At the end of 1997, after the
In re Alexandria Y. decision, three districts used the “existing Indian
227
228
family” doctrine, while two others refused. Nationally, ten states
had court rulings or statutes rejecting the “existing Indian family”

218. Id. at 529.
219. See Orange County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Renea Y. (In re Alexandria Y.), 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996). That panel refused to limit itself to situations
where neither the child nor either parent had a social, cultural, or political tie to a
tribe, insisting the doctrine might be viable in other circumstances. Id. at 686.
220. See supra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text.
221. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224(c) (West 2009) (previously codified at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 360.6(c) (West 2007)).
222. See Santa Cruz Human Res. Agency v. Paz M. (In re Vincent M.), 59 Cal. Rptr.
3d 321, 334 (Ct. App. 2007).
223. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 2001).
224. See id. at 726–27.
225. See id. at 730.
226. See id. at 731. This argument borders on the absurd because it implies that
no lawmaking body has the constitutional authority to regulate the placement of
Indian children: the federal government is precluded by the Tenth Amendment’s
reservation of power to the states, and the states are precluded by the Constitution’s
reservation to Congress of plenary power over the states in Indian affairs.
227. The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Appellate Districts used the doctrine.
228. The First and Third Appellate Districts refused the doctrine. In the middle
of 1998, the Sixth Appellate District rejected the doctrine in In re Alicia S., splitting
California at three districts on either side of the question. Kern County Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Mishiola S. (In re Alicia S.), 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 122 (Ct. App. 1998).
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230

doctrine, and eight states used the doctrine.
However, neither
lawmakers nor courts would express much sympathy for the doctrine
after that.
IV. A DECADE OF APPLYING THE ICWA: STATUTES, JURISPRUDENCE,
AND THE WANING INFLUENCE OF THE “EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY”
DOCTRINE
A. Statutory Rejection of Exceptions to the ICWA
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in In re S.C. was
tremendously influential outside of Oklahoma, within the state it
might have had an unintended effect. Less than two years after In re
S.C. was handed down, the Oklahoma Legislature abrogated the
231
influential decision.
Title 10, chapter 1B, section 40.1 of the
Oklahoma Code recognized the tribes’ interest in Indian children,
“regardless of whether or not said children are in the physical or legal
custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state
232
proceedings are initiated.”
Section 40.3 used the same language
and specified that the rules applied to all voluntary and involuntary
233
custody proceedings involving Indian children, except divorce and
234
delinquency proceedings explicitly excepted by the ICWA. It took
another decade for those statutes to reach the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, but when the case arrived the court was unequivocal:
Because of recent statutory amendments to the Oklahoma
Act, which in essence codified the holding in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, we determine that the
“existing Indian family exception” is no longer pertinent to
Indian child custody proceedings in Oklahoma . . . . To the
extent that In the Matter of S.C.; In the Matter of Adoption of
Baby Boy D.; and In the Matter of Adoption of D.M.J., are incon235
sistent with our holding, they are expressly overruled.
In the meantime, opponents of the “existing Indian family” doc229. These states include Alaska, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey,
Oklahoma (statute), Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah.
230. These states include Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, Tennessee, and Washington.
231. See Leatherman v. Yancey (In re Baby Boy L.), 103 P.3d 1099, 1101 (Okla.
2004).
232. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.1 (West 2009).
233. Id. § 40.3(B) (2009).
234. See id. § 40.3(A)(1)–(2).
235. In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d at 1101 (citations and footnote omitted).
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trine elsewhere learned that they could do through legislation what
they may have failed to do in the courts. California lawmakers
236
237
incorporated language from In re Bridget R. in their statute.
Although that was not enough to sway the Second Appellate Dis238
trict, the statute proved dispositive to the Sixth Appellate District,
reversing that court’s position on the “existing Indian family”
239
240
doctrine. The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 2003
241
and upheld by the Iowa Supreme Court two years later. In 2004,
242
Washington abrogated Crews by specifying in statute that “[i]f the
child is an Indian child as defined under the Indian child welfare act
243
[sic], the provisions of the act shall apply.”
Finally, in 2007, the
Minnesota Legislature declared that
[a] court shall not determine the applicability of this chapter
or the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to a child custody
proceeding based upon whether an Indian child is part of
an existing Indian family or based on the level of contact a
child has with the child’s Indian tribe, reservation, society,
244
or off-reservation community.
In 2009, Wisconsin became the fifth state to reject the “existing
245
Wisconsin’s courts had, on
Indian family” doctrine by statute.
several occasions, refused to rule on the “existing Indian family”
246
doctrine, but both houses of the Wisconsin Legislature approved

236. James R. v. Cindy R. (In re Bridget R.), 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 520 (Ct. App.
1996).
237. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224(c) (West 2009) (previously codified at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 360.6(c) (West 2007)) (“A determination by an Indian tribe
that an unmarried person, who is under the age of 18 years, is either (1) a member of
an Indian tribe or (2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and a biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe shall constitute a significant political affiliation
with the tribe and shall require the application of the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act to the proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
238. See supra Part III.B.4.
239. See Santa Cruz Human Res. Agency v. Paz M. (In re Vincent M.), 59 Cal. Rptr.
3d 321, 333–34 (Ct. App. 2007).
240. IOWA CODE § 232B.5 (2006).
241. See In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147, 150–51 (Iowa 2005).
242. Crews v. Hope Servs. (In re Adoption of Crews), 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992)
(en banc).
243. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.040(3) (West Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
244. MINN. STAT. § 260.771, subdiv. 2 (2008) (emphasis added).
245. Act 94, WIS. STAT. § 938.028(3)(a).
246. See Wisconsin v. Debra F. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Branden
F.), 695 N.W.2d 905 (Table) (Wis. Ct. App. 2005), 2005 WL 645191, *3 n.3; Brown
County v. Marcella G. (In re Shawnda G.), 634 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
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247

B. Judicial Responses: Plain Language and Legislative Intent in
Upholding the ICWA
Just as in the initial post-Holyfield period, the primary argument
against the “existing Indian family” doctrine relied on the plain
language of the statute. Courts that adopted the doctrine continued
to insist that such was the intent of Congress; however, Louisiana
Appellate Judge Stewart wrote that, “when the wording of a statute is
clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit,” describing a “virtually
universal rule of statutory construction [that] is found in federal law
248
This is especially true when a statute contains express
as well.”
exceptions, as the ICWA does for divorce proceedings and delinquen249
cy hearings, for the implication is that the expressed exceptions are
250
In the ICWA, “[n]one of the
the only allowable exceptions.
applicable provisions impose any sort of threshold requirement that
the proceedings involve an ‘Indian family’ or that the child have any
251
particular contact with the tribe or with his or her tribal heritage.”
And “[n]o amount of probing into what Congress ‘intended’ can alter
252
what Congress said, in plain English[.]”
Courts also eventually developed a response to the argument,
first put forth in In re S.C., that by refusing to amend the ICWA
Congress intended the “existing Indian family” doctrine to remain.
Judge Stewart was the first to pierce the wall, pointing to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s rejection of a similar argument in Firestone Tire &
253
Rubber Co. v. Bruch:
247. Press Release, Office of the Governor Jim Doyle, Governor Doyle Signs
Wisconsin’s Indian Child Welfare Act, (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.asp?locid=19&prid=4781.
248. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 338 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
249. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv) (2006) (“‘[A]doptive placement’ . . . shall not
include a placement based upon an act which, if committed by an adult, would be
deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the
parents.”).
250. See In re Guardianship of Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla. 1991).
251. Tubridy v. Ironbear (In re Adoption of S.S.) (S.S. I), 622 N.E.2d 832, 834 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993), rev’d, 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995).
252. Kern County Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Mishiola S. (In re Alicia S.), 76 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 121, 128 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 n.* (S.D.
1991) (Sabers, J., concurring specially)) (emphasis in original).
253. See 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (“We do not think that . . . legislative inaction
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The bill’s demise may have had nothing to do with Congress’s view on the propriety of de novo review. Without
more, we cannot ascribe to Congress any acquiescence in
the arbitrary and capricious standard. “[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
254
intent of an earlier one.”
Later that same year, the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out that
an earlier version of the ICWA included language that would have
codified a version of the “existing Indian family” doctrine, requiring
that a child have “significant contacts with an Indian tribe” before the
255
Act applies. By the time Crystal R. was decided in late 1997, even a
judge adopting the “existing Indian family” doctrine felt compelled to
report a laundry list of unsuccessful bills that would have amended
256
the ICWA to either codify or abrogate the doctrine. Congressional
inaction no longer could serve as evidence of congressional intent.
C. What’s Old is New Again: Rejecting the Bridget Rationale and
Upholding the Constitutionality of the ICWA
Although the In re Bridget R. decision introduced a new twist in
“existing Indian family” jurisprudence, it should not have been
unexpected. After all, the argument that the ICWA was unconstitutional was at least as old as the “existing Indian family” doctrine. The
South Dakota Supreme Court rejected just such an argument in
257
1980. Petitioner Martha Kay Guffin argued that the ICWA violated
the Tenth Amendment by infringing upon the traditional state power
258
over family law.
But the court found that, because the Indian
Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to legislate Indian
259
affairs, there was no Tenth Amendment violation so long as the

carries the day . . . . Though ‘instructive,’ failure to act on the proposed bill is not
conclusive of Congress’[s] views . . . .”).
254. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 340 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)) (alteration in
original).
255. See Tubridy v. Iron Bear (In re Adoption of S.S.) (S.S. II), 657 N.E.2d 935,
951–52 (Ill. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting S. 1214, 95th Cong. § 102(c)
(1977)).
256. See Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 423 n.10 (Ct. App.
1997).
257. See Guffin v. R.L. (In re Guardianship of D.L.L.), 291 N.W.2d 278, 280–81
(S.D. 1980).
258. See id. at 280.
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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260

ICWA was not exercised arbitrarily.
Guffin further argued that
Indian children were being denied equal protection that amounted to
261
This argument, too, the court
“invidious racial discrimination.”
rejected, citing the federal government’s broad authority to treat
262
Indians differently based on their political status and not race.
263
Similar arguments were rejected by appellate courts in Oregon and
264
Illinois.
It is not surprising then, that no court that has considered the In
re Bridget R. constitutional argument has embraced it. As noted,
California’s Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, adopted the
“existing Indian family” doctrine under a similar standard in Orange
265
County Social Services Agency v. Renea Y. (In re Alexandria Y.), but
subsequent decisions from Division Two have called into question the
266
precedential value of that holding even in the Fourth District. The
Court of Appeals of Tennessee mentioned the In re Bridget R. holding
267
in a footnote before ruling on other grounds.
Every other court
268
that has heard the argument has rejected it. The argument against
the equal protection claim has changed little in almost thirty years
since the South Dakota Supreme Court first rejected it. And, as the
Sixth Appellate District of California correctly pointed out, the
enactment of the California statute effectively undermined the Tenth
260. In re Guardianship of D .L. L., 291 N.W.2d at 281.
261. Id.
262. See id. (citing Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., in &
for Rosebud County, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)).
263. See Angus v. Joseph (Application of Angus), 655 P.2d 208, 213 (Or. Ct. App.
1982) (finding the ICWA did not violate equal protection).
264. In Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding
the ICWA did not violate due process or equal protection). In another line of cases,
non-Indian parents have argued that their right to equal protection under the law is
violated because, by virtue of their not being Indians, they are not entitled to the
higher standard of review applied to Indians under the ICWA; these cases have been
universally unsuccessful. See, e.g., In re Marcus S., 638 A.2d 1158, 1159 (Me. 1994);
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Firlet (In re Miller), 451 N.W.2d 576, 578–79 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
265. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996).
266. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
267. In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880, at *16 n.1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997).
268. See Santa Cruz Human Res. Agency v. Paz M. (In re Vincent M.), 59 Cal. Rptr.
3d 321, 334–36 (Ct. App. 2007); S. v. S. (In re Adoption of Hannah S.), 48 Cal. Rptr.
3d 605, 610 (Ct. App. 2006); In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 19–21 (Colo. App. 2007); In re
Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996); Jeffrey A. v. Tohono O’odham
Nation (In re Baby Boy C.), 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 325–26 (App. Div. 2005); L.S.W. v. K.B.
(In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625, 634–36 (N.D. 2003); Letherman v. Yancey (In re Baby
Boy L.), 103 P.3d 1099, 1107 (Okla. 2004).
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Amendment argument, because either Congress has the authority to
legislate under the Indian Commerce Clause, or the state has the
269
authority to regulate under its reserved powers. Finally, both the
New York Appellate Division and the California Sixth Appellate
District demonstrate that the “interest” described in In re Bridget R.’s
270
due process argument is not a right under the U.S. Constitution,
271
but exists solely in the common law of California.
D. 2007: A Banner Year for Upholding the ICWA
While the past decade has seen a steady trickle of states rejecting
the “existing Indian family” doctrine, and no states adopting it, 2007
was a particularly good year for the ICWA. Minnesota and Colorado
became the latest states to reject the “existing Indian family” doctrine,
and the balance of authorities shifted dramatically in California.
Minnesota first faced the “existing Indian family” doctrine in In re
272
Welfare of Children of S.W., which was decided in January, 2007. The
respondent argued that the court should apply the doctrine and that,
without the doctrine, the ICWA would violate equal protection, due
273
process, and the Tenth Amendment. The trial court rejected both
274
However, the question did not reach the
of these arguments.
appellate court because the respondent failed to file a notice of review
275
challenging the trial court’s decisions. By mid-year, the question
was moot, as the Legislature had amended state law to prohibit courts
276
from invoking the “existing Indian family” doctrine.
Several months later, Colorado rejected the “existing Indian fam277
ily” doctrine in In re N.B., a stepparent adoption case. The child’s
natural mother was a member of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of
278
the Fort Peck Reservation in Montana, but the child spent most of

269. In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 336.
270. Id. at 334–35; In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
271. See In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (“[O]ther than Bridget R. and its
progeny, we are unaware of any authority holding that a child’s ‘right’ to a stable
home environment in the context of adoptive placements is one of constitutional
dimensions.”) (citation omitted).
272. 727 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
273. See id. at 152–53.
274. Id. at 153.
275. Id.
276. See MINN. STAT. § 260.771, subdiv. 2 (2008).
277. 199 P.3d 16, 19–21 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, No. 07SC961, 2008 WL
757927 (Colo. Mar. 24, 2008).
278. Id. at 18.
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his life in Colorado with his natural father and his stepmother.
When the stepmother moved to terminate the mother’s parental
rights and adopt the child, she argued, among other things, that the
“existing Indian family” doctrine should apply because the child had
never been a part of an Indian family, and that the ICWA was
280
281
The court rejected each of these arguments.
unconstitutional.
First, the court invoked Holyfield, noting that no parent should be able
to unilaterally undermine either the child’s interest or the tribe’s
282
interest in the child. Second, the court noted the lack of any such
exception in the ICWA itself, despite the inclusion in the ICWA of
283
exceptions for delinquency and dissolution proceedings. Finally,
the court warned that such an exception “would empower state courts
to make an inherently subjective factual determination as to the
‘Indianness’ of a particular child or the parents, which courts are ‘ill284
equipped to make.’”
In re Vincent M. brought about a dramatic shift in the balance of
authorities in California. More important than simply changing
285
precedent in the District, In re Vincent M. was the first case to
explicitly validate the California statute that abrogated the “existing
286
Indian family” doctrine.
Additionally, In re Vincent M. was an indepth, well-reasoned decision that provides ample ammunition for
future courts looking to fend off the doctrine.
V. A NAIL IN THE COFFIN: IN THE MATTER OF A.J.S. BURIES THE
“EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY” DOCTRINE IN KANSAS
In 2009, the “existing Indian family” returned to its roots, where
supporters learned the hard way that “you can’t go home again.”
287
Kansas courts had upheld the doctrine as recently as 2008. But in In
279. Id. at 17–18.
280. Id. at 18.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 21–22.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 22 (internal citations omitted).
285. The “existing Indian family” doctrine remains viable in just one district now,
having been repudiated by four with one district split; before In re Vincent M., the
doctrine was viable in two districts, with three rejecting and one split.
286. See Santa Cruz Human Res. Agency v. Paz M. (In re Vincent M.), 59 Cal. Rptr.
3d 321 (Ct. App. 2007).
287. In re M.B., 176 P.3d 977, 985 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the “existing
Indian family” doctrine “precludes application of the ICWA when the Indian child’s
parent or parents have not maintained a significant social, cultural, or political
relationship with an Indian tribe”). The Kansas Supreme Court had most recently
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re A.J.S., the Kansas Supreme Court was confronted again with the
question of whether the ICWA should apply when a non-Indian
mother voluntarily relinquishes custody of an Indian child who has
288
never been part of an Indian family. This time, after both carefully
reviewing the reasoning in In re Baby Boy L. and closely examining
Holyfield and the many state court decisions, the Kansas Supreme
Court unanimously overruled In re Baby Boy L. and abandoned the
289
“existing Indian family” doctrine.
In In re A.J.S., the parents were not married, and had dated for
290
only about a month before the mother became pregnant.
The
father was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation and the
291
mother was non-Indian; the parties stipulated, however, that A.J.S.
292
would qualify as an “Indian child” under the ICWA. “Nevertheless,
the district judge ruled that ICWA was not applicable to this termination and adoption because A.J.S. had never been part of any Indian
family relationship. Under these circumstances, the district judge also
denied the Cherokee Nation’s motion to intervene and declined to
293
modify the temporary custody order.”
In its analysis of the “existing Indian family” doctrine, the court
begins with Holyfield. Although recognizing both that Holyfield did not
specifically address the “existing Indian family” doctrine, and that the
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to take “existing Indian
family” cases, the Kansas court nonetheless finds Holyfield relevant for
its recognition of “the central importance of the relationship between
an Indian child and his or her tribe, independent of any parental
294
relationship.”
The court quotes extensively from Holyfield’s
discussion of Congressional intent, including both Congress’s
concern over the sheer number of Indian children being removed
295
from their homes by state agencies, and Congress’s concern for and
296
desire to protect the interests of tribes.
Following this lengthy
considered the doctrine in 2006, but refused to consider the doctrine, holding that is
was not applicable to the case. See In re Adoption of B.G.J., 133 P.3d 1, 10 (Kan.
2006).
288. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 544 (Kan. 2009).
289. Id. at 549.
290. Id. at 544.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 545.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 547 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50
(1989).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 548.
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quotation, the In re A.J.S. court concluds that “[t]he Court’s result and
rationale in Holyfield recognized that ICWA grew in part out of
concern for preservation of tribal interests in Indian children and that
those interests could not necessarily be defeated by the desires of
297
parents or concerns over placement permanency.”
The court then briefly lists the states either rejecting and adopting the “existing Indian family” doctrine, noting that there are far
298
more of the former than of the latter.
In doing so, the court
explicitly refuses to consider congressional attempts to amend the
ICWA to either affirm or reject the doctrine, noting that neither side
299
has succeeded in persuading Congress to amend the statute.
Finally, the court lays out its case for rejecting the “existing Indian family” doctrine and overruling In re Baby Boy L. First, the
doctrine conflicts with the plain language of the ICWA, which does
not include any consideration of the child’s cultural circumstances
300
among the statutory exceptions. Second, the court concludes that
the “existing Indian family” doctrine is at odds with the ICWA’s goal,
recognized in Holyfield, of protecting a tribe’s interest in Indian
301
children. Recognizing the long-term implications of severing the
relationship between a child and his or her tribe, the court points out
that the tribe loses something in that process: “As counsel for the
Cherokee Nation emphasized at oral argument before us, a child
302
removed now from the tribe cannot later be a voice for the tribe.”
Third, the court criticizes what it calls the “secondary justification” for the holding in In re Baby Boy L.: that because the mother
consented to adoption only by the chosen parents and would revoke
her relinquishment and raise the child herself if that adoption were
not upheld, in either case the child would be raised away from an
303
Indian environment.
The In re A.J.S. court noted that such
297. Id.
298. Id. at 548–49.
299. Id. at 549.
300. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 549 (Kan. 2009) (asserting that the language of
the ICWA makes no exception for children, such as A.J.S., who have not been raised
within the Indian community).
301. Id. at 549–50.
302. Id. at 550.
303. Id. In In re Baby Boy L., the court wrote:
The mother of Baby Boy L. gave a consent to the appellees to adopt her
child. The consent was limited to the two named appellees and was for
their benefit only. She has made it clear that if this adoption was denied for
any reason, or if an attempt was made to place the child for adoption under
the terms of the Act, she would revoke her consent and again take custody
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declarations are of the mother’s intent only, and that the father’s and
304
the tribe’s interests are expressly protected by the ICWA. In fact,
the court concludes, the “existing Indian family” doctrine allows for
the breakup of a family without allowing that an “Indian family” might
305
eventually be created.
Lastly, the court notes the “widespread and well-reasoned criticism” of the “existing Indian family” doctrine among both scholars
306
307
and courts. After quoting extensively from In re Baby Boy C., the
court finally concludes:
Given all of the foregoing, we hereby overrule Baby Boy L.,
and abandon its existing Indian family doctrine. Indian
heritage and the treatment of it has a unique history in
United States law. A.J.S. has both Indian and non-Indian
heritage, and courts are right to resist essentializing any ethnic or racial group. However, ICWA’s overall design, including its “good cause” threshold in 25 U.S.C. § 1915, ensures
that all interests—those of both natural parents, the tribe,
the child, and the prospective adoptive parents—are appropriately considered and safeguarded. ICWA applies to
this state court child custody proceeding involving A.J.S.,
308
and the Cherokee Nation must be permitted to intervene.
The court carefully considers all of the arguments for the “exist309
310
ing Indian family” doctrine and thoughtfully rejects them.
of her child, and never consent to his placement with his father or with the
father’s extended Indian family, the Kiowa Tribe, the grandparents or
anyone else. . . . Under either the Act or Kansas law, any proceedings which
the Kiowa Tribe might have undertaken if allowed to intervene would have
been useless. Any attempt to effect the preferential placement contemplated by the Act would necessarily result in the removal of the baby from
the custody of appellees and thereupon there being no consent by the
mother to any such action, the child would be returned to her. We do not
believe that the Congress intended such ridiculous results nor do we believe
that the Kiowa Tribe could in good faith recommend such a procedure.
In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 177 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S.,
204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
304. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 550.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 550–51 (listing numerous court cases and publications that suggest
the “existing Indian family” doctrine conflicts with the purpose of the ICWA).
307. 805 N.Y.S.2d 313 (App. Div. 2005).
308. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 551.
309. The court did not express an opinion on the argument and began with James
R. v. Cindy R. (In re Bridget R.), 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996), that the
“existing Indian family” doctrine is necessary to save the ICWA from constitutional
infirmities under the due process and equal protection clauses. See In re A.J.S., 204
P.3d at 549. However, as noted, no court outside of California has adopted this
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Short of a U.S. Supreme Court decision or congressional action
expressly barring the “existing Indian family” doctrine, the Kansas
Supreme Court’s explicit abrogation of its holding in Baby Boy L.
might be the most dramatic thing that could have happened in
“existing Indian family” jurisprudence. Kansas is where the “existing
Indian family” doctrine began, so it goes without saying that the
state’s reversal is a monumental event. Moreover, each of the six
states where the “existing Indian family” doctrine remains valid relied
extensively on the In re Baby Boy L. rationale that the doctrine effects
Congress’s intent —a rationale that In re A.J.S. concludes was both
flawed to begin with and was repudiated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
311
findings in Holyfield. In each of those states, attorneys seeking to
defend the rights of Indian children, Indian families and Indian tribes
now have new and persuasive ammunition with which to seek
reconsideration of the “existing Indian family” doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
The “existing Indian family” doctrine is not dead yet. The doc312
trine remains good law in six states. Even more importantly, nearly
half of the states have not yet addressed the “existing Indian family”
313
doctrine either in statute or in common law. Courts in those states
may still have to consider whether the ICWA applies to children who
argument. See supra Part IV.C.
310. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 551.
311. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 65 (1989).
312. See supra note 10. Tennessee recently affirmed its commitment to the
“existing Indian family” doctrine in In re K.L.D.R., No. M2008-00897-COA-R3-PT,
2009 WL 1138130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009).
313. These states are Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. At least one jurist has erroneously
stated that Nebraska adopted the “existing Indian family” doctrine. See Tubridy v.
Iron Bear (In re Adoption of S.S.) (S.S. II), 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995) (Heiple, J.,
concurring) (including Nebraska v. D.W. (In re Interest of C.W.), 479 N.W.2d 105
(Neb. 1992), in a list of “existing Indian family” cases that the U.S. Supreme Court
had denied cert). However, In re C.W. concerned not the “existing Indian family”
doctrine, but the ICWA’s “good cause” language. In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d at 118.
Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court has been asked to rule on the “existing
Indian family” doctrine, but refused because the doctrine would not have applied in
the case before the Court. See Wisconsin v. Debra F. (In re Termination of Parental
Rights to Branden F.), 695 N.W.2d 905 (Table) (Wis. Ct. App. 2005), 2005 WL
645191; Brown County v. Marcella G. (In re Shawnda G.), 634 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2001); Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re SNK),
108 P.3d 836, 838 (Wyo. 2005).
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qualify as “Indian children” under the ICWA but who fail to be part of
an “Indian family” or who have little or no connection (yet) to their
tribes.
However, given the number of courts that have rejected the “existing Indian family” doctrine —especially the recent, thorough, and
thoughtful decisions in In re Baby Boy C., In re Vincent M., In re N.B.,
and In re A.J.S. —the number of states that have codified the doctrine’s rejection, and the substantive repudiation of the rationales
used to support it, the doctrine’s demise appears imminent.
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